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Presentation Outline
♦Ares I Architecture Overview
♦Human Rating Requirements  
♦Ares I Avionics Architecture Overview
♦Maintaining Critical Functionalities through Redundancy
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Reference Mission Timeline
Main (Upper Stage)U St (J 2X) SM Panel and LAS      
Engine Cutoff (MECO)
pper  age  ‐  
Engine Start
Altitude: 194,000 ft



















Ares I Architecture Overview
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Human Rating Requirements
♦As of 2008 the NASA requirements for certain critical systems in  ,         
new human-rated vehicles have changed to rebalance reducing 
failure occurrence with maximizing failure containment
♦F NPR 8705 2B H R ti R i t f Srom  . , uman- a ng equ remen s or pace 
Systems:
• The space system shall provide failure tolerance to catastrophic events 
(minimum of one failure tolerant), with the specific level of failure tolerance            
(one, two or more) and implementation (similar or dissimilar redundancy) 
derived from an integrated design and safety analysis … . Failure of primary 
structure, structural failure of pressure vessel walls, and failure of 
i d li t d f th f il t l i tpressur ze  nes are excep e  rom e a ure o erance requ remen  … 
♦Based on maximum Ares I flight time, modifying avionics design to 
single fault tolerance reduced cost and weight without significantly 
d i li bilitre uc ng re a y
♦Shuttle, in contrast, was developed with dual fault tolerance for 
critical electronics
Sh ttl th fi t NASA h t d ft b ilt t th t d d• u e was e rs   uman-ra e  spacecra  u  o ose s an ar s
• Shuttle intended for ~2 week missions; cannot provide crew escape (i.e. 
land) without working avionics
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Major Avionics Functions and Locations
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DFI
LOX / LH2 Sensors
Electrical Power Distribution




U t h l i ith i ti li f t d t♦ se ec no og es w  ex s ng supp ers o  space ra e  par s
• MIL-STD-1553B data bus technology used for most critical functions
• RS-422 used for other high criticality functions
• Computers contain commercial CPUs and open-standard backplanes      
• Ethernet supplier base being developed for space rated components used in 
non-critical applications and interfaces external to the Ares I
♦Centralize overall Ares I command & control within the Upper Stage
• First Stage and J-2X engine avionics perform data collection, actuator 
oversight, and local command routing, while the Upper Stage computers 
maintain system control from terminal launch countdown to Orion separation
♦Minimize mutual connections that might lead to a common mode        -  
hardware failure of the redundant avionics strings
• No cross-strapping of data buses
• No cross-strapping of power
• Cross-Channel Data Links are independent, point-to-point transmission lines
♦Ease the software development effort by using a commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) operating system for C&DH computers
• DO-178B certifiable software that has passed rigorous verification
• ARINC 653 (time and space partitioning) to separate software modules
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Ares I Avionics Architecture Heritage
♦An evolved version of existing/previous systems     
• Shuttle Data Processing System (DPS)
− Fly-by-wire control system
− Four string system
•All strings share all critical tasks (all strings perform identical/redundant 
work to produce identical/redundant outputs)
− Link to Main Engine controllers that each use a pair of self-checking pairs 
for error detection error masking and recovery of function after an error  ,  ,       
•Ares I Upper Stage Engine (J-2X) also expected to use an engine 
controller based on a pair of self-checking pairs for the same reasons
− Thrust Vector Control (TVC) actuators vote incoming commands from all 
strings for fault-tolerance of the steering function
− Independent strings of attitude control hardware linked to a single avionics 
bus (each bus is linked to any single flight control computer at a given time)
S lf b i Shi C t l S t• eawo  su mar ne p on ro  ys em
− Four string, voting system
−Controlled functions include steering, diving, and depth control
• X-38
−Prototype Crew Return Vehicle (ISS lifeboat)
− Flight control computers form a voting system; one processor per string
−Maximum automation, minimal reliance on the crew 9National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Systems Timeline
♦Shuttle – NASA, first flight in 1981
♦Seawolf – US Navy, first ship of class commissioned 1997
♦X-38 – NASA, cancelled (after several atmospheric test flights but 
prior to first space flight) in 2002
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Control System: Redundant Data Sources Feed 
Cross-Strapped Computers and Detached Actuators
Adds checksum, destination, & 
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M = Majority function 
(bit-for-bit voting)
V = Validate 
function
CCDL = Cross-Channel Data Link, RM = 
Redundancy Management, I/O = input/output task
System Availability through Redundancy
♦ Initially, all redundant hardware (strings of hardware):
• Is running 
• Shares equal command authority
• Shares equal actuation authority   
• Shares equal sensing responsibility
• Receives all redundant copies of all inputs from all redundant strings
♦ If a Fault occurs:   
• Faults are masked or corrected
• Faults are tracked
♦Fault vs Failure: . 
• Repeating (contained) faults by the same component show an increased risk 
for future uncontained failure
• Faults relating to critical functions or faults not easily masked can be treated 
as a failure immediately
♦Failure Recovery:
• Force the failed component into a benign (often inactive state)
• Graceful Degradation: Redundant components already in operation continue 
to provide needed functionality without the need for a formal transfer of 
control or the delay associated with enabling replacement components
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Fault Management: Sensor / Data Source Failure or 
I/O Collection Failure
Adds CRC, destination, & 
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M = Majority function 
(bit-for-bit voting)
V = Validate 
function
Fault Management: Error in Data Sharing
The data distributing method based on two rounds of exchange attempts to deliver copies of data from all redundant sources
Adds CRC, destination, & 
sequence count to
            ‐                          
to each computer.  Values not universally available are not used by any computer (e.g. all computers filter out source 1 to 
avoid the “Byzantine General” problem). Filtering must be done before updating local data stores to maintain uniformity.
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M = Majority function 
(bit-for-bit voting)
V = Validate 
function
Fault Management: Failed Application Processor 
(corrupted memory location, timing sliver, etc.)
M j i i f i l i if id i l i d b 2
Adds CRC, destination, & 
sequence count toSelect input copy to use i t ti
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M = Majority function 
(bit-for-bit voting)
V = Validate 
function
Fault Management: Recovery from Output 
Distribution Failure
Sh ld f il l di ib d d f h h l
Adds CRC, destination, & 
sequence count toSelect input copy to use i t ti
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M = Majority function 
(bit-for-bit voting)
V = Validate 
function
Fault Management: Output Selection Function Fails
V lid F i j d h M j i i f i h l d h d ( l
Adds CRC, destination, & 
sequence count toSelect input copy to use i t ti
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V = Validate 
function
M = Majority function 
(bit-for-bit voting)
Fault Management: Errant Transmission of a 
Minority Value
A fil i i l OR l i l l i i d d OR i
Adds CRC, destination, & 
sequence count toSelect input copy to use i t ti
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M = Majority function 
(bit-for-bit voting)
V = Validate 
function
Fault Management: Failed Output Transmission
Th hi ll f f ll fli h f i li i h i i i h l d
Adds CRC, destination, & 
sequence count toSelect input copy to use i t ti
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M = Majority function 
(bit-for-bit voting)
V = Validate 
function
Fault Management: Actuator Error
F il d ll f d i f ( ll b i ll l )
Adds CRC, destination, & 
sequence count toSelect input copy to use i t ti











   

















































































20National Aeronautics and Space Administration
M = Majority function 
(bit-for-bit voting)
V = Validate 
function
Summary
♦The Ares I avionics uses a multi-string, voting architecture to 
provide single fault tolerance and enhanced crew safety
♦The system draws upon experience gained from building earlier 
systems such as Shuttle, X-38, and Seawolf submarines
♦The system uses existing technologies for critical systems as       ,  
much as possible, to reduce development risk
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BACKUP MATERIAL 
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Acronym / Abbreviation List
♦ 1° – Primary ♦ LH2 – Liquid Hydrogen
♦ 2° – Secondary
♦ Al – Aluminum
♦ C&DH – Command and Data Handling




































US U St♦ LAS – Launch Abort System
♦ lb – pounds (force)
♦  – pper  age
♦ V – Validate
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Abstract
♦The Ares I is the next generation human-rated launcher for the 
United States’ Constellation program.  This system is required to 
provide single fault tolerance within defined crew safety and 
mission reliability limits.  As part of the effort to achieve those 
safety goals, Ares I includes an avionics subsystem built as a multi-
string voting architecture The avionics design draws upon,  .       
experience gained from building fly-by-wire systems for Shuttle, X-
38, and Seawolf.  Architectural drivers for the avionics design 
include using proven technologies with existing suppliers of space         
rated parts for critical functions (to reduce overall development 
risk), easing the software development effort by using an off-the-
shelf, DO-178B certifiable, ARINC-653 operating system in the main 
flight computers, minimizing mutual data and power connections 
that might lead to a common-mode hardware failure of the 
redundant avionics strings, and centralizing overall Ares I 
command & control within the Upper Stage. 
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